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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals
by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(3).
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant/plaintiff charo/H ^ppwil»r'uvi"ii<Jdni

WHIM I X H .

Upon a motion to suppress appellant's evidence, the Honorable Joseph
I. Dimick, Fourth Circuit Judge of the Provo Circuit, granted appellee's
motion to suppress and entered an Order to that effect on March 1,
1990.
This appeal is from the Order to suppress Appellant's evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether under Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44.10(6) a defendant

must be given a "roasonabln upporlumlv" ID uhlani .-in independent test.
II.

Whether Appellee was given a reasonable opportunity to

effectively exercise her right to an independent test in addition l< > I ho lest
or tests administered by the polia? ,is permitted hy I N.ili Code Ann. §416-44.10(6).
III.

Whether Appellee failed to obtain an additional test?

IV.

Whether Appellef

V.

Whether the proper remedy when a defendant is not given

additional test?

reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to an independent test is
suppression of the police evidence.

l

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-44.10 (Set forth in its entirety in the
Addendum)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 14, the defendant, Mary Werner, was arrested by
Provo City Police for driving under the influence. (R. at 1). Upon being
asked to submit to a breath test, she initially declined and requested a
separate and independent urine test. The police officers then
admonished her concerning Utah's Implied Consent Law.
Consequently, Mrs. Werner submitted to the Intoxilyzer test. (T. at 46).
Defendant then renewed her request for an independent test. The
police then responded by giving her a vial within which to secure her own
test. (Id.) Defendant then went into the restroom, unattended and
unwitnessed, and secured her own sample. (T. at 47). Defendant was
also given other materials with which to stop the vial. (R. at 105). After
being released, defendant took her urine sample to Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center for testing. The hospital refused to test the sample for
the reasons that they did not find it sealed and they were unsure of it's
chain of custody. (Id.)
On December 18,1989, defendant, Mary Sue Werner, made a
motion to suppress the evidence of the Intoxilyzer breath test. (R. at 12).
At trial, counsel stipulated to the above facts. It was also noted that the
arresting officer was aware of evidence gathering procedures regarding
the gathering of evidence, including urine tests, and recited the
procedures to the Court. (T. at 32).
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Upon ruling on defendant's motion to suppress, the judge found
that defendant was read and made aware of her right to an independent
test. (R. at 105). The judge also t i n icludod lhal. defendant was given
materials within which to secure her sample, and later given more
materials with which to seal her sample. Consequently, the judge held
that the above police involvement was equivalent to them giving
assistance and advice to defendant to securing her own independent
test. (R. at 107). The court also found that the sample clearly could not
have been admitted into evidenn» ''l I1 "> '

M|

"i'elusion of the

Court was that the police did not provide a reasonable opportunity to the
defendant to effectively exercise her right to an independent test, and
that such conduct ',!"1 n'l t" <l«u'v ' I ' " (Intend; i"i Hi m process of law. (Id.)
The City appeals from that decision.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellee was not given a reasonable opportunity to gather her own
evidence due to the advice and assistance rendered by the police. The
plain meaning of Utah Code Ann «j n h 44 11 in ,i does not require the
police to assist one suspected of an alcohol related driving offense in
obtaining an independent blood alcohol test. However, when tho police,
by their own choice, undertake lo a'Mst ancle H qwv. advice to a
defendant regarding ways to secure her own evidence or tests, the
police become responsible for the assistance and/or advice they qivo.
Otherwise, if the trial Court's decision is overtmnnl it would be likely that
in the future the police could frustrate the attempts of defendants to
secure their own tests by giving advice and assistance which would

3

render any independent tests inadmissible, which would ultimately make
U.C.A. §41-6-44.10(6) meaningless.
Appellee did not fail to obtain a test nor was she unable to obtain a
test. But rather, appellee was not given a reasonable opportunity to
secure an admissible test by a doctor of her own choice because of the
advice and assistance of the police. Therefore, the correct remedy is
suppression of the police evidence.
The trial court's decision to suppress the evidence would not place
an inordinate burden on the police but rather continue to make them
responsible for their actions. The decision would actually have the effect
of relieving officers of the duty to assist suspects in gathering their own
evidence.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant alleges that the Trial Court's ruling suppressing evidence
contradicts public policy, places an inordinate burden on the police and
is in direct contravention of both statute and law. However, appellee
believes that the Trial Court's ruling suppressing police evidence, will not
place an inordinate burden on the police in gathering their own evidence
and will not burden the police to gather exculpatory evidence for a
defendant. Police efficiency would not be compromised and no
message contradicting legislative intent would be given to those involved
in alcohol related activities or to the public in general.

4

A. APPELLEE WAS NOT GIVEN A REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE HER OWN EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS A DENIAL OF
HER DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(6)(a) and (b) state in relevant part
that "The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician
of his own choice administer a chemical test" and that the "failure or
inability to obtain the additional test does not affect the admissibility of
the results of the test" taken by the police. It is clear from the statute that
appellee had the right to obtain an independent test. It is an
uncontroverted fact that appellee requested an independent test before
and after she submitted to the breath test administered by the police. It
is also reasonable to assume from the language of the statute that
appellee should be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain an
independent test. Otherwise, if a defendant is not given a reasonable
opportunity to secure her own test, the statute is meaningless and due
process is sacrificed.
Those suspected of driving while intoxicated in many other
jurisdictions have not only a codified and/or judicially interpreted right to
obtain an independent test but also the right to have a "reasonable
opportunity" to do so.*1 However, U.C.A. §41 -6-44.10 does not explicitly
state that a defendant must be given a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain
an independent test and the Utah Courts have been silent on the issue.
Therefore, whether or not a defendant should be given a "reasonable
opportunity" to obtain an independent test is a primary issue in this
1

See: People v. Underwood. 396 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. App. 1986); Fairfax v. Smith. 330 S.E.2d 290
(S.C 1985); State v. Hilditch. 584 P.2d 376 (Or. App. 1978); State v. Dressier. 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D.
App. 1988); Bilbrev v. State. 531 So.2d 27 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987), State v. Reed. 36 Wash. App. 193,
672 P.2d 1277 (Wash. App. 1983).
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appeal. Appellee believes it only reasonable and in line with current
rulings of other states with similar statutes that U.C.A. §41-6-44.10 be
interpreted to give a defendant a "reasonable opportunity" to obtain an
independent test.
Whether a defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to obtain
an independent test is dependant on the facts of each individual case.
See. Bilbrey v. State. 531 So.2d 27, 30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); State v.
Dressier. 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. App. 1988); Blaine v. Suess. 93 Wash.
2d 722, 612 P.2d 789 (Wash. 1980). The facts in this case are that
Appellee clearly requested an independent test before and after the
police administered the breathalyzer test. Appellee was given advice as
to how to secure her own sample and she was provided a vial in which to
secure a urine sample. She was told where the bathroom was and while
unattended secured her own sample. The police then gave her other
material with which to stop the vial. Appellee believes that since the
police took affirmative action by giving her advice, materials and
assistance regarding the manner in which to secure her own
independent test that the police (as opposed to the hospital, doctors or
any one else) interfered with the test, at least to an extent causing
appellee to not have a reasonable opportunity to have an independent
test performed.
Appellant argues that the level of police interference must be
"substantial" or "unreasonable interference" for the court to suppress
police evidence. Appellant also refers to such words as "egregious" and
"overt" to describe the type of police interference necessary to suppress
evidence. Appellee believes that the above terms relating to police
interference are not synonymous and that the level of police interference
6

certainly does not have to rise to the level of being "egregious" for a
defendant to prevail on a suppression motion. However, appellee
believes that the interference which occurred in this case was certainly
"substantial" and "unreasonable."
In State v. Clark. 762 P.2d 853, 855 (Mont. 1988) as cited by
appellant, the Court held that "[o]ur decisions do not mandate police
officers to affirmatively act to obtain exculpatory evidence, but instead, to
avoid interference with efforts on the part of the accused to obtain a
sampling of his blood." (Emphasis added.) See also. Commonwealth v.
Alano. 388 Mass. 871,448 N.E.2d 1122,1128 (Mass. 1983); Dressier at
551. To uphold the circuit court's ruling would not mandate police to
affirmatively act in behalf of a defendant. In State v. Hilditch. 584 P.2d
376, 377 (Or.App. 1978) the Court stated that the police were not
required to affirmatively act to assist the defendant secure his own
exculpatory evidence. However, the court went on to imply that once the
police have undertaken to assist the defendant, the police become
responsible for the assistance that they give.2
The police should be responsible for the assistance they give.
After all, the police have guidelines to follow and have been trained in
gathering evidence. As stated at trial, the arresting officer had expertise
in gathering evidence and knew the correct procedure to obtain a valid
urine sample. He knew or should have known that the procedure he
proscribed for appellee to acquire her own evidence would guarantee
the inadmissability of the evidence.

2

See Also. Annot., 45 A.LFUth 11 (1986).
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B. APPELLEE DID NOT FAIL TO OBTAIN AN ADDITIONAL
TEST NOR WAS SHE UNABLE TO DO SO.
Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44.10 (6) clearly gives an accused the right
to have an additional test or tests administered at his or her own
expense. However, U.C.A. §41 -6-44.10 (6)(b) states that "the failure or
inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or
preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace
officer." (Emphasis added.) Appellant relies heavily on this section of the
code. However, appellee neither failed, nor was she unable to obtain an
additional test.
The Court of Appeals in Oregon stated that "Thus, we think the
term 'failure' to obtain a blood test must refer to a situation where an
arrestee makes no effort or request to obtain a test." Hilditch. at 377.
See also. Dressier, at 552. According to the language of Hilditch and
Dressier appellee did not fail to obtain an independent test. The
stipulated facts in this case are that plaintiff made numerous requests for
an additional urine test both before the police conducted the Intoxilyzer
test and after the completion of the Intoxilyzer test. Appellant seems to
suggest that appellee failed to obtain an additional test due to her "lack of
diligence," "carelessness," and "failing to protect her interest." Appellee
clearly did not lack diligence in her efforts to secure an independent test.
As stated, she requested the independent test both before and after the
police administered Intoxilyzer tests. Also, having received materials
and instructions from the police on the manner in which to secure her
own urine sample, she proceeded to carry out the instructions given to
her. After her release, appellee went to the hospital to have her sample
8

tested by a competent physician. The hospital declined to test the
sample for various reasons, some of which being that the vial was not
properly sealed or marked. Appellee believes that all of the facts above
clearly show that she did not lack diligence, she was not careless, and
she did not fail to protect her interest in her attempt to obtain an
independent test. Therefore, according to Hilditch and Dressier,
appellee did not fail to obtain an additional test.
"•[liability' to obtain a test refers to the situation where, for some
reason independent of the conduct of either the arrestee or the police,
such as loss of the blood sample by the hospital performing the test, an
independent chemical analysis cannot be obtained." Hilditch. Id. Again,
according to the language of Hilditch and Dressier, plaintiff was not
unable to obtain an independent test. Appellant erroneously states that
the police did not interfere, but rather the hospital caused the
interference that is claimed by appellee. Under the rules of evidence
appellee's urine sample was clearly inadmissible before the sample ever
reached the hospital. The hospital, therefore, correctly refused the
responsibility of testing the sample. Appellant goes on to state that "Mrs.
Werner was free to consult with any of the several hospitals in the
immediate area in order to have her urine sample tested." See Brief of
the Appellant, p. 15. This statement again seems to suggest that the
blame should be put on the hospital for not testing the urine sample, or
that the blame rests with appellee due to her failure to check with other
hospitals to have the sample tested. However, the Court found that the
urine sample could never have been admitted into evidence even if it
had been tested. Again, due to police interference well before appellee
was released from custody, the urine sample was clearly inadmissible
9

according to the rules of evidence. Third party interference becomes
irrelevant due to the interference occurring well before any third party
was ever involved.
Appellant also suggests that according to the language in State v.
Goodwin. 160 Ariz. 366, 773 P.2d 471 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) that appellee
acted unilaterally in her attempt to secure an independent test and that
the police interference was not unreasonable. However, the facts in
Goodwin are clearly different from the facts in the case at hand. In
Goodwin, the police, having administered at least two breathalyzer tests,
gave defendant one of the breathalyzer ampoules. It was explained to
the defendant that the sample was for his own benefit. However, the
defendant stated that he had no desire to keep the sample. The police
then responded that if he wanted to throw it away he was free to do so.
The police did not throw the ampoule away, the defendant threw it away.
The Court held that the defendant, due to his own actions, waived his
right to the second test. The defendant clearly knew that he had the
right to the second sample, and had possession of his own potentially
valid evidence; yet, by his own actions, waived his right by discarding the
sample given him by the police. Simply stated, the defendant didn't want
the sample, threw it away and, therefore, waived his right to it. This is
clearly different from the facts in the case at hand. Appellee requested
the right to have a second sample taken and tested and the police
assisted in acquiring the urine sample. Contrary to appellant's view,
appellee did not act unilaterally in asking for and acquiring an
independent test, but rather, was assisted by the police in acquiring that
test. There was clearly no interference by any third party which would
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have rendered appellee unable to obtain an independent test. The only
interference involved in this case was that of the police officers by giving
appellee instructions as to how to acquire her own independent test, by
giving her the materials in which to secure her own test, and by later
giving her yet more materials and instructions with which to stop the vial.
The police and appellee entered into a bilateral relationship; the police,
by giving assistance and materials, the appellee by relying on the
instructions and materials given her by the police. Therefore, the actions
of appellee were not unilateral.
Because plaintiff clearly requested an independent test both
before and after the police administered Intoxilyzer test, she did not fail
to acquire a test as prescribed under Utah Code. There was also no
third party interference which would preclude appellee from obtaining an
independent test. The only interference in this case was that of the
police officers.
C. AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS APPELLEE'S RIGHT TO AN
INDEPENDENT TEST IN ADDITION TO AND DIFFERENT
FROM THE TEST TAKEN BY THE POLICE OFFICERS
At issue in the cases cited under heading "C" of the Brief of the
Appellant was the exculpatory nature of the evidence gathered by, or
known to the police officers and whether the police had the duty to
preserve such evidence for the defendant. The language and intent of
Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-44.10(6) is essentially the same as that of the
Wash Rev. Code §46-61 -506(5) (1983) (effective January 1,1985). The

u

Washington Supreme Court stated that the intent of the above cited
Washington statute was to afford a D.U.I suspect:
the opportunity to obtain evidence with which to
impeach the results of a single breathalyzer test, if
such evidence exists. The suspect also takes the risk
that the second test will verify and substantiate the
result of the first. The statute strikes an appropriate
balance between
the rights of the accused to gather evidence in his own
defense and the need to avoid undue burdens upon
the State. The accused is given the right to choose the
type of additional chemical test to be administered and
the person to perform the test, so long as that person is
available, willing and "qualified" to do so by being on the
statutory list.
State v. Stannard. 109 Wash.2d 29, 742 P.2d 1244 at 1247 (Wash. 1987)
(emphasis added). The issue is not whether appellee has the right to
police gathered evidence or evidence known to the police to exist as is
the case in the majority of the cases cited by appellant which refer to
evidence that an accused wanted that was acquired by the police and
then destroyed by the police.3
Trying to obtain exculpatory evidence from the evidence that the
police had gathered and then destroyed or obtaining the evidence that
was known to the police is not equivalent with police interfering with the
right of a defendant to secure her own independent evidence.
Furthermore, the evidence in the cases cited by appellant had been
tested, and therefore, the exculpatory value of the evidence was known.
In the case at hand, the evidence that appellee attempted to acquire was
3

Califomia v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479 M984): United States v. Agurs. 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Lavton
Citv v. Watson. 733 P.2d 499 (Utah 1987); People v. Humes. 762 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1988); and
Arizona v. Youngblood.
U.S.
, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988).

12

not tested, and the exculpatory value was not known. Therefore, it is
possible that appellee's urine sample when tested may have been
exculpatory. The evidence that Appellee attempted to obtain was
material and not merely cumulative. It was an additional test and
different from that of the police administered test. However, as stated
above, the exculpatory value of the evidence is not the real issue in this
case. The issue remains, was appellee given a reasonable opportunity
to have an independent test?
D. THE PROPER REMEDY IS SUPPRESSION OF THE POLICE
EVIDENCE
Appellee believes that the proper remedy in cases that involve
police denying a defendant a reasonable opportunity to obtain an
independent test is suppression of the police gathered evidence. See.
State v. Burns. 364 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1988); State v. Hilditch. 36 Or. App.
497, 584 P.2d 376 (Or. App. 1978); State v. Hughes. 181 Ga. App. 448,
352 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. App. 1987); Fairfax v. Smith. 380 S.E.2d 290 (S.C.
1985); Gordan v. State. 190 Ga. App. 55, 378 S.E. 2d 362 (Ga. App.
1989)
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, appellee neither failed, nor was
she unable to acquire an independent test, but rather, the police
interfered with her right to acquire an independent test and
the proper remedy is suppression of the Intoxilyzer test results. The
13

appellee respectfully requests that this court affirm the Trial Court's
ruling.
~f£r^
DATED this I ^ day of -September
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any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acta alleged to have
been committed whilo I he person was operating or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug.
test" in the first sentence in Subsection l2)(a»;
designated the former third and fourth sentences in Subsection 12Ma* as present Subsection <2>tb»; designated the final two sentences
in former Subsection <2MaMiiit as present Subsections 12Mc» and (ch and redesignated former
Subsections (2Mb) to <2Md) as present Subsections l2>(e> to (2Mg); and made stylistic
changes.

Ilislorv: C. 1053, II 6-4 1.10. enacted by L.
1981. ch. 120, $ 13; !,. 1983. ch. 09, ft 16;I;
1087. ch. 129. ft 3; 1987, ch. 138, ft 11; 1987,r»
ch. 161, § 113: 1987 (1st S.S.l. ch. 8, ft§ 3. 4;I;
1988. ch. 118. § I; 1990, ch. 30. ft 21.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted^
"specific chemical tost" for "specific test" in theQ
second sentence in Subsection (lMc); deleted'
* «»r any one or all of the tests" after "chemical

NOTES TO DECISIONS
sides of his mouth, thereby preventing officers
from obtaining an adequate, viable breath
sample. Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P 2d 280
(Utah Ct. App 1989>.

ANALYSIS

tMounds for requesting test.
Refusal to submit to test.
Right to refuse test.
Cited
(•rounds for requesting test.
This section does not require an arrest prior
to taking a blood sample, and allows drawing_
blood (mm an unconscious person \\it\i or with-!_
out an arre<t Slate v. Wight. 76ft l\2d 122
•I'lah t'l App 108S».
Refusal to submit to test.
h n s e r s conduct was refusal when, although'•
be verbally agreed to tests, he obstructed thee
process by sticking his tongue over and chewing on the mouthpiece and blowing out thee

Right to refuse test.
Hlood sample taken from a juvenile motorist
who was not placed under arrest, who was not
informed that he could refuse to submit to the
lest, and who did not consent thereto, was
taken contrary to tlu- provisions of this section,
ami the test results were therefore inadmissible In re I.. 771 I» 2d 1068 tl.Hnh 19891, vacating 739 |» 2d 1124 (Utah Ct. App 19871 (noted
in bound volume under this catchlinc)
Cited in Rurkett v. Schwendiman. 773 l\2d
42 (Utah 19891

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
I'tah Law Review. — Recent Developmentss
in I tab law — Judicial Decisions — CriminalI
Law. 1988 Utah L. Rev. 177.

41-6-44.11.

A.L.IL — Sufficiency of showing of physical
iinability to take tests for driving while intoxiccated to justify refusal, 68 A L R 4th 776

Alcohol and drug testing fee.

(11 (n) In addition to any other fee, a $60 alcohol and drug testing fee shall
be imposed on any person convicted of an offense under Section 41-641 or
a local ordinance which complies with the requirements of Section
41-6-43.
(b> The fee shall he collected by the court issuing the conviction.
<2> Fees collected under this section shall be deposited in the General Fund.
History: C. 1953. 11-6 11.11, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 49, ft I.
Effective Dntes. — Laws 1990, ch 49 he-

TRAFFIC ,.JLES AND REtiUL.iiON8

41-6-44.20.
Drinking alcoholic heverage and open containers in motor vehicle prohibited — Definitions
— Exceptions.
( D A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a motor
vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on any highway.
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains
any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or the
contents of the container partially consumed.
(3) in this section:
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105.
(b) "Chartered bus" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105.
(c) "Limousine" has the meaning given in Section 32A-1-105.
(d) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally
occupied by the operator and passengers and includes areas accessible to
them while traveling, such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not
include a separate front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the
vehicle not accessible to the operator or passengers while inside the vehicle.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers in the living quarters
of a motor home or camper.
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers traveling in any licensed
taxicab or bus.
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers who have carried
their own alcoholic beverage onto a limousine or chartered bus that is in
compliance with Subsections 32A 12-213(1 Kb) and (c).
History. C. 1953, 41 6-44.20, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 272, 6 1; 1987, ch. 92, ft 55; 1987,
ch. 138, ft 12; 1990, ch. 23, ft 188.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective February 21, 1990, substituted

41-6-45.

"Section 32A 1 105" for "Section 32A-1-5" at
the end of Subsection (3 ><a); added present Subsections (3Kb) and (3)(c); redesignated former
Subsection (3)(b) as Subsection (3)(d); and
added Subsection (6).

Reckless driving — Penalty.

Cros9-Hcference9. — Jurisdiction of juvenile court, ft 78 3a 16.

came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI. Sac. 25.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

volved is an agency of the state, not the city.
City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 P.2d 920 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

Constitutionality.
Driver's license hearing.
—Collateral estoppel.
—Double jeopardy.
Proof to sustain conviction.
—Sufficient.

—Double jeopardy.
As a driver's license hearing is clearly civil,
double jeopardy did not require trial court to
dismiss driving under the influence charges.
City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 P.2d 920 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

Constitutionality.
Subsection (1), which prohibits driving or
controlling a vehicle with a specified blood-alcohol level, does not create a conclusive presumption, and is not, therefore, unconstitutional, because the defendant is allowed to
challenge the accuracy of the test on any relevant ground. City of Orem v. Crandall, 760
P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

—Collateral estoppel.
A city is not collaterally estopped from proceeding with a criminal action for driving under the influence because of the decision at the
driver's license hearing not to suspend the defendant's driver's license, since at the driver's
license hearing, the governmental entity in-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Horizontal gaze nystagmus test:
use in impaired driving prosecution, 60
A.LR.4th 1129.
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by
third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's
negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16.
Passenger's liability to vehicular accident
victim for harm caused by intoxicated motor
vehicle driver, 64 A.L.R.4th 272.
Driving while intoxicated: "choice of evils"

defense that driving was necessary to protect
life or property, 64 A.L.R.4th 298.
Cough medicine as "intoxicating liquor" under DUI statute, 65 AL.R.4th 1238.
Horseback riding or operation of horsedrawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute,
71 A.LR.4th 1129.
Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving
statute, 73 A.L R.4th 1139.

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis
dence.

Evi-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

vant ground. City of Orem v. Crandall, 760
P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Constitutionality.
Section 41-6-44(1), which prohibits driving
or controlling a vehicle with a specified bloodalcohol level, does not create a conclusive presumption, and is not, therefore, unconstitutional, because the defendant is allowed to
challenge the accuracy of the test on any rele-

working properly four days before defendant's
breath test even though no evidence had been
presented showing that the machine had been
calibrated and tested both immediately before
and immediately after his breath test, since
this procedure, known as "bookending," is not
o n l y r e dundant and expensive but, under the
procedures mandated by the legislature and
carried out by the department, is unnecessary.
Triplett v. Schwendiman, 754 P.2d 87 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

Proof to sustain conviction.
—Sufficient.
The trial court had sufficient evidence before
it upon which it could find that the defendant's
blood-alcohol content at the time of the violation was .08% or higher, where the test, conducted a short period of time after the arrest,
showed a result of .09%. There was credible
evidence that supported a finding that the consumption of beer immediately before the arrest
made no appreciable difference in the test results, and there was nothing in the record that
suggested that the defendant had anything
other than a normal conversion ratio. City of
Orem v. Crandall, 760 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

D r i v e r ' s license h e a r i n g .

Constitutionality.
Rebuttable presumption.
Tests admissible.

Fact that intoxilyzer machine malfunctioned
after test was administered was not sufficient
to show that defendant was prejudiced, where
defendant offered no independent evidence to
show how the malfunction affected her test resuits so that the presumption of the validity of
the test was not rebutted. State v. Vigil, 722
P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Tests admissible.
There was sufficient evidence to admit intoxiiyzer test results where the machine had been

41-6-44.10

Rebuttable presumption.
State created a rebuttable presumption that
a breath testing machine was accurate by introducing into evidence an affidavit showing
that two qualified technicians had tested the
machine four days before defendant's arrest
and had found it to be functioning properly.
Triplett v. Schwendiman, 754 P 2d 87 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
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41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified offenses may
prosecute for certain DUI offenses and driving
while license suspended or revoked.
The following class A misdemeanors may be prosecuted by attorneys of
cities and towns, as well as by prosecutors authorized elsewhere in this code to
prosecute these alleged violations:
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor violations of Subsection
41-6-44(6)(a)(ii) or a local ordinance similar to Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii)
that complies with the requirements of Section 41-6-43; and
(2) alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which consist of the person
operating a vehicle while his operator's license is suspended or revoked
for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with
the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207,
or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a
result of a plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one of or more of those sections or ordinances.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, e n a c t e d by L.
1983, ch. 102, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 40; 1990,
ch. 299, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the intro-

ductory paragraph and Subsection <1); designated the former section as Subsection (2); and
made a related stylistic change in present Subsection (2).

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or
drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning,
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of
test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of
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alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44.
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any other
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine may not select the test
or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to
arrange for any specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test
requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil,
or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit
to the requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test
requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the
test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. Following
this warning, unless the person immediately requests that the chemical
test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be
given.
(b) A peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the division,
immediate notice of the division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle When the officer serves the
immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division,
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the division.
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by
the division, serve also as the temporary license.
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after
the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol
and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had refused to
submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1).
(e) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the
hearing shall be made in writing within ten days after the date of the
arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division shall
notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practicable. If
the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing before
the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall be
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revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the date
of arrest.
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the division, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under
Subsection 41-2-112(14), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative
costs. The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court
decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the
revocation was improper.
(g) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division under this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person
resides.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or
tests shall be made available to him.
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer,
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason
to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the
taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
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